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ABSTRACT
Enforcing open source licenses such as the GNU General Public
License (GPL), analyzing a binary for possible vulnerabilities, and
code maintenance are all situations where it is useful to be able to
determine the source code provenance of a binary. While previous
work has either focused on computing binary-to-binary similarity
or source-to-source similarity, BinPro is the first work we are aware
of to tackle the problem of source-to-binary similarity. BinPro can
match binaries with their source code even without knowing which
compiler was used to produce the binary, or what optimization level
was used with the compiler. To do this, BinPro utilizes machine
learning to compute optimal code features for determining binary-
to-source similarity and a static analysis pipeline to extract and
compute similarity based on those features. Our experiments show
that on average BinPro computes a similarity of 81% for matching
binaries and source code of the same applications, and an average
similarity of 25% for binaries and source code of similar but different
applications. This shows that BinPro’s similarity score is useful for
determining if a binary was derived from a particular source code.
1 INTRODUCTION
There are a number of situations where one wants to determine the
source code provenance of a binary – that is, the source code from
which a binary originates. This can help determine the authorship,
intellectual property ownership rights and trustworthiness of a
binary. For example, the GNU General Public License (GPL) [10]
requires any one who modifies and distributes an application pro-
tected by the license to make the source code modifications publicly
available – a requirement that is often violated, as demonstrated by
numerous GPL infringement lawsuits [24, 31, 35]. To determine if
a distributed binary infringes, a plaintiff must show that the binary
was derived from the source code of an application protected by the
GPL, often without the cooperation of the producer of the binary.
Since GPL only requires source code to be shared if the binaries are
released to the public, source code provenance can also be used by
organizations and developers as an additional check to ensure that
they do not mistakenly release binaries derived from GPL source
code.
In other instances, a user or an organization may wish to know
the source code provenance of a binary for security or maintenance
purposes. Knowing the identity of the source code of a binary may
help identify possible vulnerabilities. For maintenance purposes, it
can help identify possible ways of updating and maintaining the
binary if the original source code for the binary has been lost.
In an ideal world, the translation from source code to binary is
a straightforward process and determining whether a binary was
derived from a particular source code is simply a measurement of
the similarity of the source code and binary. For example, one might
compute a call-graph of both binary and source code and compute
the similarity of the graphs using one of a number of well-known
methods [21, 33]. However, in reality, optimization applied during
the compilation process can result in a binary that has a significantly
different call-graph and subroutines than the original source code.
These optimizations have traditionally been the bane of systems
that attempt to compute binary-to-binary similarity [2, 7, 9, 11].
Unfortunately, the heuristics compilers use to determine when and
where optimizations are applied are opaque and difficult to predict,
often being sensitive to a large number of factors in the source
code.
Since determining the source code provenance of a binary re-
quires access to the source code features during the matching pro-
cess, we expect that the accuracy of matching in this case to be
better than binary-to-binary matching. In this work, we show this
is indeed the case, especially in the case when code optimizations
such as function inlining are applied. Our most surprising result is
that determining when and where a compiler will apply inlining
can be done without analysis of the compiler code at all. Instead,
we generate a training set of optimized and unoptimized binaries
by simply compiling unrelated applications, and use this to train a
machine learning model, which can then be used to predict when
optimization will be applied by the compiler. As one would expect,
this works fairly well when the compiler used for training the model
is the same as the one used to produce the binary, but surprisingly,
it works fairly well even when it is a different compiler, or the same
compiler used with different optimization levels.
We demonstrate the utility of this approach with a tool called
BinPro, which, given a binary and a source code, computes a similar-
ity score for them. A high similarity score indicates that the binary
is very likely to have been the result of compiling the source code,
while a low similarity score indicates that the binary was likely
compiled from some other source code. We evaluate BinPro on a
corpus of applications and libraries and demonstrate that BinPro’s
similarity score correlates well with whether binaries and source
code really match even across different compilers and optimization
levels.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
(1) We present BinPro, which is the first technique we are
aware that is able to match a program’s source code and
binary using a novel combination of machine learning and
static analysis.
(2) We evaluate BinPro on a corpus of 10 executable applica-
tions and 8 libraries, and demonstrate that BinPro produces
similarity scores ranging from 59% to 96% and an average
of 81% for matching binaries and source code, and scores
ranging from 10% to 43% with an average of 25% for non-
matching binary and source code. This demonstrates that
BinPro is able to determine whether a binary was derived
from a particular source code or not.
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(3) We show that BinPro is insensitive to different compilers
or compiler optimization levels used to compile the binary.
We further show that BinPro’s machine learning models,
when trained on one compiler, GCC, is able to predict
when function inlining optimizations will be applied by a
completely different compiler, the ICC Intel compiler.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
review related work on computing binary-to-binary similarity and
source-to-soruce similarity in Section 2. Then, we describe the
design of BinPro Section 3. Implementation details are given in
Section 4 andwe evaluate BinPro’s effectiveness in Section 5. Finally,
we conclude in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
Determining whether two programs are equivalent or not is re-
ducible to the halting problem, and is thus undecidable. For the
same reason, it is difficult to prove that compilers produce binary
code that is equivalent to the input source code [18, 22]. However,
despite these difficulties, researchers have still made significant
progress with a number of proposals for practically measuring the
similarity of two programs. Previous work in computing program
similarity breaks down into three major sub-problems: a) measur-
ing the similarity of sections of binary with corpus of source code,
b) measuring the similarity of two binaries and c) measuring the
similarity of two sections of source code. We review related work
in the other two subproblems below.
2.1 Measuring binary−source code similarity
Hemel et al., developed the Binary Analysis Toolkit (BAT), a system
for code clone detection in binaries to detect GPL violations [13]. It
recursively extracts strings from a binary, such as a firmware image.
It attempts to detect cloning of code by matching strings with a
database of packages of GPL projects. It also attempts to detect
similarity through data compression and binary delta techniques.
While BAT solves slightly different and harder problem in that it
determines whether a binary code contains statically linked library
code, it has high false negatives. This means that, unlike BinPro,
BAT finds an incorrectly matching source code for a given binary.
BinSourcerer [1] and RESource [28] identify individual source func-
tions in a binary, rather than computing similarity between the
entire binary and source code. However, there are no measurements
on real applications on how well their approaches performs.
Di Penta et al. [6] describe a tool that identifies licensing of
JAVA archives (JARs) by analyzing JAVA .class files and submit-
ting detected package and class names to Google Code Search to
identify the provenance of the code. However, it is much easier to
decompile JAVA byte-code and generate code almost similar to the
original, rather than C/C++ machine code, which is in the case of
BinPro. Davis et al. [5] also provides similar approach for finding
provenance of JAVA applications.
2.2 Measuring binary similarity
Much of the work on measuring binary code similarity has the goal
of classifying malware into families by similarity, or to detect if two
binaries may be equivalent for vulnerability detection. As a result,
the goal is to detect semantic similarity between binaries even if
the actual instructions or instruction sequences are different. The
work in this area can be broadly classified into static and dynamic
approaches
Static approaches. Static approaches extract features from bina-
ries, such as control flow graphs (CFG) and then compare the graphs
of the two binaries. Zynamics BinDiff [9] is an industry standard
state-of-the-art binary diff-ing tool. BinDiff matches a pair of bi-
naries using a variant of graph-isomorphism algorithm. BinDiff
extracts CFGs from two binaries and tries to match functions be-
tween each binary using heuristics. The major drawback of BinDiff
is that it performs extremely poorly when comparing two bina-
ries that are compiled with different optimization levels or with
different compilers. Even though the programs may be function-
ally equivalent, many compiler optimizations affect program CFGs
greatly and thus make graph matching ineffective.
Inspired by BinDiff, BinSlayer [2] and Pewny et al [25] perform
bipartite matching using the Hungarian algorithm. This allows
them to be more resilient to CFG changes due to local compiler
optimizations. DiscovRE [8] uses an even looser matching algo-
rithm to match binaries using structural and numeric features of
the CFG. However, despite the increased accuracy despite CFG
transformations, neither approach handles function inlining very
well, which introduces code from a inlined callee function into the
caller function’s CFG.
While BinPro does rely on function-level code features, BinPro
does not use features from a function’s CFG for matching. Our
experiments empirically show that CFG features are unreliable
for program matching, and thus BinPro excludes them from its
matching strategy and relies on other features instead. In addition,
BinPro uses machine learning to predict when functions might
be inlined by the compiler, allowing BinPro to properly compute
similarity even for inlined functions.
Dynamic approaches. Rather than perform a similarity measure-
ment over statically extracted graphs, these methods measure simi-
larity by comparing the execution of programs. Egele et al. propose
Blanket Execution, BLEX [7], an engine to match functions in bina-
ries, with the goal of either classifying malware or aiding automatic
exploit generation. BLEX uses dynamic equivalence testing, which
executes the code of both binaries and compares the effects of the
executions to determine the similarity of the binaries. BLEX at-
tempts to ensure that every basic block is executed at least once
per function. However, for large functions, BLEX may not complete
and in practice, analysis is halted when the execution time exceeds
a specified timeout value or a maximum of 10,000 instructions have
been executed.
BinHunt [11] generalizes individual executions by using sym-
bolic execution and a theorem prover to determine semantically
equivalent basic blocks. However, BinHunt suffers from perfor-
mance bottlenecks due to its symbolic execution engine and it is
unclear whether it can scale to large, real-world applications. In
general, while execution enables dynamic approaches to sidestep
the unpredictability of compiler optimizations, they often come
with higher costs in terms of execution time and required compute
resources for large programs. In addition, reliable measurement
requires the execution of a reasonable fraction of the paths in a pro-
gram, but the number of program paths tends to grow exponentially
with program size.
BinPro’s analysis uses only statically extracted code features and
does not consider individual instructions, making its analysis much
closer to the static approaches outlined above. As a result, BinPro
easily scales to program sizes in the hundred’s of thousands of lines
of code with only modest resource requirements (10’s of gigabytes
of RAM). Despite this, BinPro’s innovations allow it to be resilient
to compiler optimizations.
A strawman alternative to BinPro might be to compile the source
code to binary and then perform one of the previously proposed
binary-to-binary comparisons. However, because BinPro has access
to features in source code, we show that these features can be used
to better predict compiler optimizations such as inlining, which
have frustrated previous static approaches.
2.3 Measuring source similarity
The motivations for measuring source code similarity are usually to
detect bugs that result from copying code or to detect code plagia-
rism. CCFinder [17] and CP-Miner [19] analyze the token sequence
produced by a lexer and deduce equivalence when duplicate to-
ken sequences, which indicate potential code clones. Such systems
however, can only detect exact copies, otherwise known as code
clones.
More sophisticated systems use abstractions of the source code
to gain resilience to syntactic differences in source code that don’t
affect the semantic meaning of the code. For example, ReDeBug [15]
normalizes tokens to remove semantically irrelevant information,
such as whitespace, comments and variable names. It then uses
normalized token sequences to find code clones with the goal of
scalably detecting unpatched code clones in OS-distribution scale
code bases. DECKARD [16] uses abstract syntax trees as an abstrac-
tion for computing source code similarity. The trees are represented
as numerical vectors, which are clustered using Euclidean distance.
Yamaguchi et al. [36] extend this idea by determining structural
patterns in abstract syntax trees, such that each function in the
code could be described as a mixture of these patterns. This repre-
sentation enables identifying code similar to a known vulnerability
by finding functions with a similar mixture of structural patterns.
More recently, VulPecker applies machine learning to the problem
of source code similarity for detecting vulnerabilities [20].
While related, these systems solve a different problem than Bin-
Pro in that they look for semantic similarity in two code samples
written in the same language. As a result, they can rely on sim-
pler syntactic comparisons without having to perform any deep
semantic analysis. In contrast, BinPro seeks to detect similarity be-
tween source code and binary, which are syntactically different. As
a result, BinPro uses semantic code features, such as string and in-
teger constants, function and library calls and function declaration
information to compute similarity.
3 DESIGN
3.1 Overview
BinPro takes as input a binary and source code, and computes a
similarity score that is the percentage of binary code functions that
match source code functions. The higher the similarity score, the
more likely that the binarywas compiled from the given source code.
BinPro is agnostic to superficial modifications, such as changing or
removing non-compiled sections of source code (i.e. comments or
white space) or even changing variable names, function names or
the order of declarations. However, more significant changes, such
as changing program structure, constant values or strings will affect
the similarity score computed by BinPro. In most cases, we expect
that the goal is to determine as closely as possible, whether the
given source code was used to compile the binary, as this is what is
usually needed for code maintenance or to detect GPL violations.
We make several assumptions in this work. We assume that
binaries are stripped of symbols and have been compiled with a
compiler that the customer does not have access to, which might
arbitrarily apply a variety of compiler optimizations during the
process of transforming source code into a binary. As a result, the
major challenge for BinPro is differentiating between differences
in binaries and source code that are due to legitimate compiler
optimizations. To overcome this, BinPro identifies code features that
are invariant under most compiler optimizations. For the remaining
optimizations that do alter these features, we use machine learning
to train BinPro to predict when these optimizations are likely to
be applied to allow BinPro to account for them. We further assume
that the binary is not obfuscated that it can be reliably disassembled
using a tool such as IDAPro [14].
Figure 1 shows the high-level work-flow of BinPro. First, a set of
code features are extracted from both binary and source code. Then
BinPro computes an optimal bipartite match between binary and
source code functions using those features. Finally, based on their
similarity, each pair of matched binary and source code functions
is labeled as uniquely matched, multi-matched (where a binary
matches several source code functions equally well) or unmatched
(where a binary code function doesn’t match any source code func-
tion). The percentage of uniquely matched functions over the total
number of functions in the binary is the similarity score for the
binary and source code. We now describe each of these stages in
more detail.
3.2 Feature extraction
To compute an optimal bipartite match, BinPro must compute a
weight that describes the similarity of each pair of binary and source
code functions. To do this, BinPro scans binary and source code
to obtain a list of functions in each. Each source code function
is uniquely identified by its name and each binary code function
by its starting address. The code associated with each function is
not recorded since binary code cannot be directly compared with
source code for similarity. Instead, BinPro abstracts the binary or
source code into a common set of matching features for each binary
and source code function. The weights for each function-pair can
then be computed by comparing their respective matching features.
Bipartite matching implicitly assumes that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between binary and source code functions – an
assumption that is broken by function inlining optimization. To
address function inlining, BinPro uses a different set of predictive
features in the source code to predict which function calls a compiler
is likely to inline. Based on these predictions, BinPro then creates
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Figure 1: High-level work flow of BinPro.
pseudo-inlined functions that combine the matching features of the
inlined callee function and the parent caller function, and adds them
to the list of source code functions. The psuedo-inlined functions do
not actually have any source code, but exist in the list of functions
as a candidate source function that BinPro can match a binary
function with during the function matching stage. If the function
inlining occurred during compilation, the resulting inlined binary
code function will match the added inlined function.
We summarize the code features that BinPro uses in Table 1.
Because compilers decide whether to inline functions based on the
source code of the functions, these predictive features are extracted
only from source code. In contrast, matching features are extracted
from both source code and binaries. We now describe in detail how
each of the features is extracted.
Matching features. Features are extracted from binaries using
a binary analysis tool and from source code by a compiler tool
(Details on the tools are given in Section 4). Source code features
are extracted after pre-processing. Constants string literals can be
extracted from the source code directly. In binaries, the addresses
of constant string literals can be found in the constants section of
the binary and use-def analysis can be applied in both binaries and
source code to find all uses of string literals in functions. Integer
constants used in functions are extracted directly from program
statements in the source and assembly instructions in the binary.
BinPro ignores common constants 0, 1 and -1 and does not include
those in the extracted set of features. To extract the number of
function call arguments from binaries, BinPro looks for definitions
of the registers used to pass arguments to callees before a function
call to determine the number of arguments passed in a function
call, and uses those registers to determine the number of arguments
used. Compilers may optimize some of these use and definitions in
certain cases and will cause BinPro to extract the wrong number
of arguments for binary code functions. The effect of this error is
mitigated by the weight assigned to this feature in the machine
learning phase described in Section 4.2. Previous work [3] can be
used to accurately extract the number of arguments feature from
binaries. The function call graph (FCG) features is a set of callers and
callees for each function, represented as a set of function names in
the source code, and a set of instruction addresses from the binary.
Library calls can be identified and extracted as they are calls to
functions outside of the binary or source code. In practice, some
compilers perform system-specific library call substitutions (i.e.
replacing call to printf in the source code with a call to puts or
vsprintf in the binary). BinPro is configured to ignore library calls
that are substituted in this way. Compilers also occasionally insert
functions into the binary that did not come from the source code
such as __stack_chk_fail, which GCC inserts to detect stack
overflow. For our evaluation, BinPro is configured to ignore an
empirically-determined set of 19 such functions.
Compilers may also insert string literals into the binary that are
not present in the source code, such as pre-processor defined strings,
i.e. __LINE__ or __FILE__. Another more obscure case is that for-
mat strings can be substituted at compilation time when the result-
ing string could be statically resolved (i.e. sprintf(str, "%d",
5)). However, these string substitutions are difficult to whitelist as
the inserted string is dependent on both the source code and the
environment where the binary was compiled (i.e. the compilation
date or the compiler version). As a result, BinPro’s results are nega-
tively affected by these literals and may lead to matching errors, but
overall BinPro is able to accurately determine provenance despite
errors introduced by this artifact.
A feature often used by other code similarity work is the control
flow graph (CFG) of each function [2, 9, 25]. However, we find that
due to the large number of local optimizations compilers perform,
there is little correlation between source code and binary CFGs as
we will elaborate further in Section 4.2. As a result, BinPro does
not rely on CFG features for computing similarity.
Predictive features. Because BinPro has access to source code, it
is able to use the source code features listed in Table 1 to predict
which functions are likely to be inlined. Access to source code is
one of the reasons why BinPro can achieve much better results
than code-similarity tools that only work with binaries [2, 9, 11].
Compilers use these features to determine which functions will
be inlined. However, different compilers may make that determina-
tion differently, and even the same compiler may inline different
functions depending on the level of optimization specified during
compilation. Since BinPro does not assume access to the compiler or
environment used to build the binary, we cannot assume accurate in-
formation about which functions are inlined. Instead, BinPro makes
Table 1: Binary and source code features used by BinPro.
Features Matching Predictive
String constants ✓
Integer constants ✓
Library calls ✓
FCG callers ✓
FCG callees ✓
# of function args ✓
Static func ✓
Extern func ✓
Virtual func ✓
Nested func ✓
Variadic args ✓
Recursion ✓
an approximate prediction by training a classifier on a generic com-
piler used to compile a set of benchmark applications. Neither the
applications nor the compiler need to be the same as the application
and compiler on which BinPro is ultimately be used to perform
source code provenance of the binary application. The intuition is
that all compilers follow similar principles of when to inline, which
are applied independently of the application being compiled.
We build a corpus of inlined and non-inlined functions extracted
from a variety of applications and then use this set of applications
to train an Alternating Decision Tree (ADTree) classifier. We used a
decision tree algorithm because we believe that it mirrors the logic
that compilers tend to use to decide whether to inline a function or
not. To verify this hypothesis, we evaluated different machine learn-
ing algorithms from the Weka toolkit [34] and found that ADTree
was indeed the best classifier for this purpose. The trained classifier
is then applied to the source code and a list of functions that are
likely to be inlined is identified. As described above, additional
pseudo-inlined functions are created and added to the list of source
code functions. We note that BinPro does not remove the original
functions, which are predicted to be inlined, from the set of source
code functions. Instead, BinPro keeps both versions of functions in
the set – pseudo-inlined functions and its corresponding original
functions. In this way if a binary code function is not inlined then
it will be matched with its original source code function while if it
is inlined, then the resultant binary code function will be matched
with the pseudo-inlined function.
As a result, it is important that inlining prediction is accurate.
Under-predicting inlining will cause inlined binary code functions
to not match to any source code function even if the source code
and binary do match in reality. Over-predicting inlining will cause a
multitude of extra functions to be added to the source and increase
the chances that a binary code function will falsely match one of
these functions even if the binary and source code to not match in
reality.
3.3 Function matching
BinPro performs function matching by computing the pairwise
weight of each binary-source function pair and then performing
an optimal bipartite match. By representing the similarity of the
matching features between binary and source code functions as
weights, BinPro can use a bipartite matching algorithm to find a
pairing between binary and source code functions that minimizes
the differences between the pairs. Representing function matching
this way lets BinPro use known bipartite matching solutions, such
as the Hungarian algorithm [21], which BinPro uses to find a sub-
optimal solution in polynomial time, O(n3).
Since BinPro extracts FCGs for both binary and source, a reason-
able alternative to bipartite matching might have been to start at
the entry points of both binaries (i.e., main()), and then perform a
traversal of the call graph, checking each function as it is found [9].
However, this alternative will not work for three reasons. First, a
function could have several callees, and there must be a way to
disambiguate them. Second, edges in the call graph are often incom-
plete due to the use of computed function pointers, whose targets
cannot be determined statically. Third, source code equivalence
for shared (or dynamically linked) libraries cannot use this alterna-
tive because libraries do not necessarily have a single entry point
for graph traversal. In summary, the graphs extracted between
source and binary for entire programs pose problems that make
graph-traversal based similarity impractical. Bipartite matching
uses features that include properties other than graph properties,
that allows it to bootstrap the matching.
This bootstrapping property is required because FCG features
are not initially complete at the end of feature abstraction. Because
instruction addresses are used to represent the callees and callers of
binary code functions, while functions names are used for source
code functions, unless there is a mapping between instruction ad-
dresses and function names, there is no way to compare the caller
and callee features for similarity. To overcome this challenge, Bin-
Pro performs function matching iteratively. Initially, FCG callers
and callees are not used and BinPro relies on other features to
compute the weights and perform bipartite matching. Once some
functions are matched, BinPro is then able to infer a mapping be-
tween function names and instruction addresses, which BinPro
uses to update the caller and callee features and recompute weights.
Bipartite matching is then repeated iteratively until the matching
reaches a steady state. This entire process for function matching is
illustrated algorithmically in Algorithm 1.
Weights are calculated for each pair of binary and source code
functions as follows:
N∑
i=1
wiCfi (1)
Where N is the total number of features,w is the weight coefficient
for a feature and Cf is the cost for a feature. Cost for a feature of
the two sets is the same as distance between them.
Cf is a value between 0 and 1 where smaller values indicate
that the pair of functions is more similar. In the special case where
the costs for all features is 1, we assign the weight for the pair to
be a special amount MAX_WEIGHT, which indicates that the pair
have nothing in common. MAX_WEIGHT is chosen so that it is
larger than the largest possible weight that can be computed from
equation 1, allowing BinPro to separate pairs that have no features
in common from those with high cost during labeling.
The way a cost for a feature is computed depends on whether
the feature is a set (such as for string constants, integer constants, li-
brary calls, or FCG callers and callees) or whether it is a scalar value
(such as for the number of function arguments). For set features,
Algorithm 1 Function matching
function FuncMatch(BinGraph, SrcGraph)
repeat
reGenerateCallerAndCalleeNodes(BinGraph)
reGenerateCallerAndCalleeNodes(SrcGraph)
▷ Create weighted bipartite graph
weiдhts ← ∅
pairs ← ∅
for b ∈ BinGraph do
for s ∈ SrcGraph do
weiдhts ← compWeiдhts(b, s)
end for
end for
▷ Run Hungarian and assign labels
pairs ← HunдarianAlдorithm(weiдhts)
assiдnLabels(binGraph,pairs)
until steady_state = true
end function
BinPro uses a modified Jaccard to compute their weight. Recall the
standard Jaccard index:
J (B, S) = |B ∩ S ||B ∪ S | (2)
Where B and S represent a set feature from a node in the binary
graph and source graph, respectively. The problem with the stan-
dard Jaccard is that it computes the same cost regardless of whether
there are extra elements in B or S . However, compiler optimiza-
tions tend to remove code features instead of add them, so that a
binary code function is more likely to have fewer features, and less
likely to have extra features, than its corresponding source code
function. In addition, compilers are likely to only be able to remove
a few features during optimization since they have to preserve the
functionality of the original code.
To take these effects into account, we modify the Jaccard index,
as shown in equation 3, so that when B is a subset of S , then the
cost is based on the elements in S that would have to be removed
to make B, and when B is not a subset of S , the cost is based on the
features found in B that are not in S .
Cf (B, S) =

|S∩BC |
|S | if B ⊂ S
|B∩SC |
|B | otherwise
(3)
Where BC and SC represent the set complement of B and S respec-
tively.
For the number of function arguments, which is the only scalar
feature, we assign a cost of 1 if the source code and binary code
functions do not have the same number of arguments and a 0 if
they do. We treat variadic source code functions as if they have 6 ar-
guments due to the number of registers used for passing arguments
in x86-64, which is further discussed in section 4.1.
To compute the weight coefficients, we use Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO) [26] to train a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
[4] machine learning classifier. Once the training is completed, we
obtain the weight coefficient for each feature according to their
importance as determined by the SVM. We discuss details on this
training process in Section 4.2.
3.4 Labeling functions
Once weights are assigned to each edge in the bipartite graph, the
Hungarian algorithm will determine an assignment that minimizes
the total weights of all assigned function-pairs. From this, one
might assume that examining the weights of the function-pairs will
indicate how well similar the binary and source code are overall.
However, on closer inspection we find that comparing weights
across different binary-source code pairs is not particularly mean-
ingful. Using the applications evaluated in Section 5, we find that
the average weight ranges from 0.6-3.8 with an average of 1.3 when
the binary is compared with the source code from which it was
compiled, while the average weight ranges from 2.2-3.9 with an
average of 3.0 when the binary differs from the source code it is
compared with. While, as expected, the average weight for the case
where binary and source code differ is greater, the overlap in the
ranges of average weight between these two cases motivated us to
use the percentage of matched functions in the binary as a measure
of similarity instead.
To compute this percentage, BinPro first labels each function-
pair as matched, multi-matched or unmatched as follows. If the
weight of the edge between a binary code function and a source
code function is unique among all other edges to that binary code
function then it is labeled as matched. If it is not unique – i.e. the
binary code function matches several source code functions equally
well – then the binary code function is labeled as multi-matched. If
the weight of the edge is MAX_WEIGHT, it means that there are
no common matching features between the pair of functions. Such
functions are labeled as unmatched.
Matched functions provide a mapping between the instruction
address of binary code functions and the name of source code func-
tions. As mentioned earlier, this mapping is then used to recompute
the cost of the callee and caller set features, which in turn allows
BinPro to update the weights between binary and source code
functions and continue to iteratively match functions.
Finally, while functions are labels as unmatched andmulti-matched,
only the percentage of matched functions are used to compute the
similarity score.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Extracting and comparing features
Our implementation of BinPro has three major components. The
first component extracts functions and features from source code,
while the second component extracts functions and features from
binaries. Finally, a third component performs function matching
and labeling of the two sets of extracted functions and features
from binary and source code. The source code feature extraction
component of BinPro is implemented by extending the ROSE com-
piler framework [30] with 1907 Lines of Code (LOC). The source
code extraction feature processes each source file individually and
outputs each function as a description in Graphviz DOT format [12].
The functions are then linked together along with the other source
features in Table 1 using a set of Python scripts (730 LOC) using
PyDot [27] and Networkx [23] libraries.
Table 2: Weight coefficients used in function matching.
Feature Name Weight
String constants 1.469
Integer constants 0.6315
Library calls 0.2828
FCG callers 2.9293
FCG callees 2.9293
# of function args 0.9296
CFG branches 0.0002
All binary features are extracted using IDA Pro [14] and a Python
script. To extract the number of arguments, we wrote a Python
script that uses IDA Pro’s API to extract the necessary binary fea-
tures to compute the number of arguments. On the x86-64 processor
architecture, there are 6 dedicated registers used for passing argu-
ments in a function call (rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9) [32].
However, compilers may optimize away definitions and uses of
these registers, causing BinPro to only infer the number of argu-
ments in the binary correctly 64% of the time. As a result, we found
that machine learning tended to place a low weight factor on this
feature, meaning that it only came into play when all the other
features between two functions were very similar.
Function matching is implemented in 12,110 lines of JAVA code.
We have based our implementation on the Graph Matching Toolkit
framework by Riesen and Bunke [29], which provides an imple-
mentation of the Hungarian algorithm.
4.2 Application of machine learning
We train machine learning classifiers for inlining prediction during
feature extraction and to compute the optimal weights for edge
weight calculation during the matching phase. The likelihood of
inlining and the feature weight coefficients is dependent on how the
compiler applies optimizations, which depends on the optimization
level used by the compiler. For instance, there are four standard
optimization levels in the GCC compiler. GCC flag -O0 will turn
off all optimizations, whereas -O1 will turn on 31 different opti-
mizations. The flag -O2 will turn on another 26 optimizations and
-O3 an additional 9. BinPro is trained with a mix of the O2 and O3
optimizations levels on GCC, which are the most commonly used
optimization levels for production code.
To train the inlining prediction classifier, we perform a 5-fold
cross evaluation across our 10 applications. The applications in the
training set do not have to have any relation to the application for
which BinPro is eventually used to find the source code provenance.
Each application is compiled twice, once with -O2 and again with
-O3 compiler optimization levels. We use debugging symbols within
the compiled binaries to divide the functions into an inlined set and
a non-inlined set. For each application, we then selected the smaller
of the two sets (usually the set that was inlined) and randomly
select an equal size set of functions from the other set, making a
set of functions that is 50% inlined and 50% not-inlined, so that the
training is not biased on either set. For each function, we extract a
feature vector containing the predictive features for the function.
We then aggregate these functions and feature vectors across all
applications to train our inlining predictor.
The feature weight coefficients for function matching are com-
puted using a similar procedure. Again, we use a corpus of applica-
tions and compile each application using GCC, but only at the O2
optimization level so that only functions that are very likely to be
inlined get inlined. We then exclude all the inlined functions and
using the ground truth for which source code function matches
which binary code function, we create a set of function pairs for
each application composed of 50% correct matches and 50% incor-
rect matches. Inlined functions are excluded because we cannot
always combine the callee and caller features correctly, and these
errors pollute the training set. We then train the weights so that
the SVM classifier is able to maximally classify these two sets cor-
rectly across all applications in the training set. We perform a 5-fold
cross evaluation across our 10 applications and tabulate the average
computed weights from this 5-fold evaluation in Table 2, which
shows that FCG callee and callers, as well as string constants are the
main features used for matching as they have the heaviest weights.
String constants are present in 55% of functions and combined with
their high discriminating power (as indicated by the high weight
coefficient) they greatly contribute to BinPro’s effectiveness. The
number of function arguments has some discriminating power, but
is weighted lower because compilers may optimize away the uses
and definitions of function arguments, causing BinPro to incor-
rectly extract the number of arguments from binaries 36% of the
time. While still useful, integer constants and library calls have less
discriminating power because they both tend to be fairly constant
in many functions.
As mentioned earlier, we originally thought BinPro could also
use CFG features, such as the number of conditional branches
in a function, as a feature for matching functions. However, after
training the classifier, we find that it assigns very little weight to the
feature because the CFGs of functions change dramatically during
compilation, and thus do not provide a good measure of similarity if
standard compiler optimizations are applied. In practice, using this
noisy feature even with a low weight leads to more false matches,
so BinPro does not use CFG features in its matching algorithm.
5 EVALUATION
To see how effective BinPro is at computing similarity between
a binary and source code, we evaluate BinPro on the following
aspects:
• Matching code: How does BinPro score the similarity of
a binary and its matching source code, i.e. the source code
for the particular binary?
• Non-matching code: How does BinPro score the similar-
ity of a binary and its non-matching source code, i.e. the
source code for a different binary?
• Compiler sensitivity:Howdoes BinPro’s similarity score
vary with binaries compiled with different compilers and
different compiler optimization levels?
• Scalability: How does BinPro’s performance scale with
code size and complexity?
• Inlining prediction:Howwell does BinPro’s inlining pre-
dictor work?
We evaluate BinPro on a set of 10 executable applications: Proftpd
1.3.4b, Busybox 1.23.2, Apache (HTTP) 2.4.12, Bind 9.10.2,Mongoose
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Figure 2: BinPro matching accuracy on binaries and matching source code.
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Figure 3: BinPro’s matching accuracy on four sets of three similar applications. Each bar represents BinPro’s matching results
on non-matching binary and source code.
2.1.0, OpenSSH 7.1p2, Dropbear 2015.71, OpenVPN 2.3.10, Trans-
mission 2.84, Lighttpd 1.4.39, and 8 libraries: libxml1, Wolfssl 3.9.10,
libgcrypt 1.7.2, libxmp 4.4.02, Zlib 1.2.8, Curl 7.50.3, Tomcrypt, Im-
ageMagick. For this study, we use virtual machines running Ubuntu
14.04 on Intel Core i7-2600 CPUs (4 cores @ 3.4 GHz) with 32 GB
of memory.
Our BinPro prototype currently supports only code that are fully
compatible with GCC or the ICC Intel compiler because the ROSE
framework used by BinPro does not work reliably with code written
for other C/C++ compilers. BinPro also supports only x86-64 binary
1http://xmlsoft.org/no prob
2http://xmp.sourceforge.net/
code because our IDAPro scripts are implemented for x86-64 binary
code only.
5.1 Matching code
We first evaluate BinPro’s accuracy on a binary and the source
code it was compiled from. All applications in our dataset are open-
source and we use their default build configuration to compile
binaries for this experiment.We then run BinPro with these binaries
and their source code. Figure 2 gives the percentage of functions
that BinPro labels as match, un-match and multi-match for each
application. All results are generated using a 5-fold cross-evaluation
on the training sets used to build our machine learning models
so that the applications used for training are never in the set of
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Figure 4: Breakdown of BinPro’s matching results.
applications used for evaluation. BinPro produces similarity scores
between 59% and 96%, with an average of 81%. The reason BinPro
produces low similarity score of 59% for Zlib library is because Zlib
is a very small application, consists of only 127 functions out of
which 47 are library functions. A lot of these functions are very
simple, with little-to-none features, causing BinPro to not find
unique matches to source code functions and instead, it finds large
percentage of multi-matched functions.
By generating debug symbols, we obtain the ground truth map-
ping between binary code functions and their corresponding source
code functions. Using this information, we compute how often func-
tionmatching correctly assigns a binary code function to the correct
source code function. The number of function-pairs that BinPro
labels as matched that are actually matched to the wrong func-
tions in the application is also given in Figure 2. Figure 4 gives
a breakdown of BinPro’s average results across the applications.
“C-” means that BinPro correctly matched the binary code function
while “IC-” means that BinPro matched the binary code function
with the incorrect source code function. Across the applications,
BinPro correctly matches functions on average of 79.2% of the time,
whereas it incorrectly matches 1.9% of functions. Finally, 16.6% of
functions are marked as multi-matched and 1.9% as un-matched.
Upon closer inspection we find that the incorrectly matched
functions tend to be simple and have fewmatching features, making
it easy for BinPro to confuse them. When examining the multi-
matched functions, we find that the correct match is inside the set
of candidates, but that all candidates just have very similar matching
features. Unmatched functions are all simple functions that have
no matching features, and whose callers are multi-matched so the
iterations during function matching never map them to a source
code function.
5.2 Non-matching code
We evaluate how BinPro scores the similarity of a binary and its
non-matching source code. We created 4 sets of 3 applications with
similar functionality. The first set, Wolfssl, libgcrypt and Tomcrypt
are all libraries of cryptographic functions; the second set, Curl,
libxml and libxmp are all applications that involve parsing com-
plex inputs; the third set, ProFTPd, Httpd and Lighttpd are all web
servers; and the fourth set, OpenSSH, OpenVPN and Transmission
are all network utilities. We run BinPro on the binary of each appli-
cation against the source code of the other 2 applications in each
set to obtain 6 measurements for each set. Figure 3 shows the result
of this experiment. When the binary is not derived from the source
code, BinPro computes significantly lower similarity scores. BinPro
produces scores from 10% to 43% with an average of 25% across all
24 comparisons. Compared with the the lowest similarity score of
59% in the correct match case above, this shows that BinPro has
good discriminating ability to identify if a binary was compiled
from a particular source code.
5.3 Compiler sensitivity
We now evaluate how sensitive BinPro’s similarity scores are to dif-
ferent compilers and optimization levels. We select 10 applications
from our dataset. Each application is compiled into three binaries,
one compiled with GCC 4.8.2 using optimization level O2, one also
with GCC using optimization level O3, and one compiled with ICC
Intel compiler 15.0.3 using the highest optimization level O3. We
believe compilers aggressively perform source code optimization
with level O3 than O2. As a result, optimization level O2 with ICC
was not included in the evaluation.
We follow the same procedure as in Section 5.1 to run BinPro
on the matching code for this set of applications and present the
result in Figure 5. The largest change in similarity score due to
changing compilers and optimization levels is 9.4%, which we note
is still smaller than the smallest difference between similarity scores
between a binary and the source code it was compiled from and
a binary and a different source code. The average change due to
different compilation is 4.0%.
Higher levels of optimization lead to more incorrectly matched
functions, where BinPro labels a pair as matched, but the functions
do not actually match. However, even in the most adversarial case,
where BinPro is trained on one compiler, GCC, and evaluated on
binaries compiled with a completely different compiler, ICC, the
rate of incorrectly matched function pairs only increases by an
average of 2.5%.
5.4 Scalability
We evaluate BinPro’s execution time against the code size and the
number of functions. We find that BinPro execution time varies
considerably, from several seconds for small applications with a
few thousand lines of code and hundreds of functions, to almost 5
hours for Bind, which has more than half-a-million lines of code
and almost 5 thousand functions. BinPro’s execution time is roughly
proportional to the number of functions as opposed to code size. We
believe this is due to BinPro’s algorithm, which extracts features and
performs matching at a function granularity. Details on application
size and time it takes for BinPro to perform its analysis is given in
Table 3. Upon closer profiling of BinPro, we see that on average
85% of the execution of BinPro is used on loading the function call
graphs (FCG) into memory. Our virtual machines have a maximum
of 32GB of memory and as a result larger applications that consume
a large amount of memory are affected most from this restriction,
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Figure 5: BinPro’s matching accuracy across different compilers and optimization levels. Each application is compiled with
GCC -O2 and -O3 compilation flag, and Intel’s ICC -O3 (iO3).
Table 3: BinPro execution time (in minutes) compared to ap-
plication LOC (in thousands) and number of functions.
Application LOC # of functions Time (min)
Zlib 25k 127 0.02
Mongoose 4k 319 0.04
Lighttpd 101k 458 0.5
Dropbear 106k 663 0.6
Wolfssl 207k 673 0.4
libxmp 46k 709 0.6
Tomcrypt 102k 900 1
Curl 237k 1020 5
libgcrypt 252k 1303 5
OpenVPN 119k 1403 6
Apache 270k 1270 3
Proftpd 300k 1332 3
OpenSSH 143k 1574 5
Transmission 175k 1574 5
libxml 532k 2472 9
Busybox 325k 2664 75
ImageMagick 617k 3268 110
Bind 619k 4764 294
as demonstrated by the rapid increase in execution time for large
applications.
5.5 Inlining prediction
Finally, we evaluate the inlining predictor in isolation to see how
well it predicts when inline optimization will occur. We performed
a 5-fold cross evaluation across the same 10 applications as before.
The predictor is trained on GCC as described in Section 4.2 and then
evaluated on the Intel ICC compiler. The inlining prediction cor-
rectly predicts inlining on 73% of inlined functions and incorrectly
predicts inlining on 17% of non-inlined functions. This confirms
that the accuracy of the inline predictor across different compilers
is one of the reasons that BinPro is able to achieve high accuracy
even across different compilers.
6 CONCLUSION
BinPro measures similarity between a binary and a source code,
and with this measurement, is able to determine if a binary was
compiled from a source code it is compared with. When evaluated
across 18 executable applications and libraries, BinPro computes an
average similarity of 81% when binary and source code match, and
only 25% when they don’t match. Moreover, the highest similarity
for a non-matching pair of binary and source code is 43% while the
lowest similarity for a matching pair is 59% indicating that BinPro
can accurately tell if a binary was compiled from a source code
with no incorrect results.
BinPro’s most interesting result is that it is able to correctly
match functions in binaries with their source code counterparts
79% of the time on average, regardless of the compiler or optimiza-
tion level used. BinPro achieves this by using machine learning to
predict when compiler optimizations might be applied and uses
a set of matching code features combined with bipartite match-
ing to find the best match between binary code and source code
functions. By repeatedly performing the matching, BinPro is able
iteratively incorporate function call graph callers and callees into
the matching process. The careful selection of matching features,
use of machine learning, use of bipartite matching and iterative
matching all contribute to BinPro’s accuracy.
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